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Abstract: 
The influence of rating announcements on corporate debt market trading has been previously 
overlooked. Based on an event study, we examine the effects of the three types of announcements 
provided by credit rating agencies on abnormal trading volume and trading frequency in the 
Spanish corporate debt market. Additionally, by means of cross-section regressions, we establish 
what factors determine the sign and intensity of the trading reactions. The presented results 
indicate that factors related to the characteristics of the rating announcement, the issuing 
company and the economic environment are relevant in light of several hypotheses. 
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This study examines the impact of rating announcements on the Spanish corporate debt 
market trading activity: actual rating changes, outlook reports (or medium-term rating trends), 
and reviews (warnings of a possible short-term rating change) made by the “Big three” credit 
rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch). We also identify the determinants of 
abnormal trading activity by considering the peculiarities of the announcement in question, the 
issuer and the economic environment.  
Many authors present evidence of the informative content of rating announcements. Most 
of them have focused on analyzing the effects of those announced changes on stock prices (e.g., 
Hand et al., 1992; Elayan et al., 2001 or, for the Spanish market, Abad and Robles, 2006). Some 
others have analyzed these effects on corporate debt prices (e.g., Kliger and Sarig, 2000, Steiner 
and Heinke, 2001; in the European case, Gropp and Richards, 2001, Dallocchio et al., 2006; or, 
in the Spanish case, Abad et al., 2007). In the above-mentioned sources, we can find hypotheses 
regarding the effects of rating announcements that postulate on the expected performance of 
corporate debt prices, as well as possible determinant factors. However, none of them addresses 
the expected trading activity performance. 
Ratings and rating changes can result in a specific market dynamic that can not only affect 
prices, but can also directly concern the market’s trading activity. This dynamic may be caused 
by the way in which investors use ratings, as well as by its actual informative content. For 
example, the proliferation of “rating triggers” in the management of portfolios based on rating 
changes may force operators to increase their sales transactions and may even cause a trading 
activity crisis.  
In spite of the importance of the impact of rating actions on debt trading activity, there is 
almost no theory or empirical research on that question. To our knowledge, the first work on that 
topic is the paper by Abad et al. (2007), which analyzes the effects of rating announcements on 
yield spreads and different liquidity measures analyzed in the Spanish corporate debt market. 
Recently, Chebbi and Hellara (2010) studied the same question with respect to Tunisian 
securities, and Da and Gao (2010) analyze liquidity shocks around downgrades.  
Based on the work of Abad et al. (2007), in this study, we analyze how several trading 
activity measures respond to rating announcements. We also formulate different hypotheses that 
link the potential effect to different characteristics of the issue (e.g., sector or size) rating 
characteristics (such as the type of rating announcement, or if the action is expected by the 2 
market), and economic environment characteristics. Finally, we define the possible explanatory 
factors of the trading response under these hypotheses.  
A key factor in this analysis is how abnormal trading activity is measured. We consider a 
wide range of variants based on different aspects of trading activity: trading volume and trading 
intensity or frequency.  
To carry out the analysis, we analyze a sample of daily corporate bond and commercial 
paper notes data. This database of Spanish corporate fixed income assets contains information 
about the trading volume per transaction, making it possible to develop trading activity measures. 
First, we perform an event study to determine if the rating changes generate significant abnormal 
trading activity, and then we analyze the effects of the determinants by means of a cross-section 
regression analysis. 
The next section formulates the hypotheses addressing the reaction of trading activity to 
rating announcements. Section 3 presents the trading activity measures analyzed. Section 4 
describes the database. Section 5 presents the results of the empirical analysis. The main 
conclusions are summarized in Section 6. 
 
2. Trading Activity Response to Rating Announcements  
The literature presents different and sometimes conflicting theories regarding the expected 
effects of rating announcements on prices in stock and debt markets. However, these theories do 
not address expected trading activity performance. Starting from these theories, we state and test 
a set of hypotheses about the effect of rating announcements on trading volume and trading 
frequency, which Table 1 summarizes.  
[Insert Table 1] 
First, the information content hypothesis (ICH) states that rating agencies handle 
confidential information, and, therefore, rating revisions include new information for the market 
that is rapidly included into prices. From the ICH theory, we hypothesize that this inclusion of 
new information into prices accompanies an increase in market activity. On the other hand, 
market microstructure models assert that the change in trading activity after the release of new 
information is related to the existence of asymmetric information among agents and market 
makers (e.g., see Balduzzi et al., 2001). Informed investors anticipate such information and 
increase their activity before the announcement. Before the news is released, volatility increases 
and after the trading activity, volatility decreases. Nevertheless, Kim and Verrecchia (1994), in 3 
the frame of these models, state the opposite. Some traders are able to make better decisions than 
others, based on the same information, leading to information asymmetry and positive abnormal 
trading volume after the release of new information about the firm. In this context, higher trading 
activity after the rating announcement will be expected. 
The agencies’ strategic behavior can influence the information content of rating. Some 
authors, such as Howe (1995), Löffler (2004) and Altman and Rijken (2006), indicate that 
agencies apply a “through-the-cycle” methodology to achieve stability in ratings. In similar 
terms, Fledelius et al. (2004) and Löffler (2005) assert that when the rating of a company is 
changed, the agency wants to be quite sure that this adjustment is stable and is not going to be 
reversed shortly after (“reversal aversion”). With respect to the investors, the economic 
environment may also be relevant (Dialynas and Edington, 1992) because in periods of prosperity 
investors will assume higher levels of risk. 
In addition, agency behavior can reflect a “moral hazard risk problem” that would 
undermine the reliability of their ratings.
1 Almost all rating agency revenue comes from rating 
fees. One method for acting in the interest of issuers is to delay rating downgrades. With respect 
to this behavior, the rating changes would have no effect because the market would not value 
them.  
Moreover, to safeguard their reputation, agencies may prefer to proceed slowly so as not 
to make mistakes (Steiner and Heinke, 2001; Hull et al., 2004). The loss of reputation associated 
with giving a good rating to a high-risk company is more serious than that resulting from 
assigning a poor rating to a low-risk company because the first error may mean economic losses 
for investors. According to Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) and Ederington and Goh (1998), this 
asymmetry means that the agencies allocate more resources to revealing negative than positive 
information. Therefore, the impact on trading activity will be greater in downgrades than in 
upgrades. 
                                                 
1 Steiner and Heinke (2001) demonstrate that agencies may systematically overrate issuers to gain market share or 
maintain leadership. Covitz and Harrison (2003) analyze if agencies are biased in favour of issuer interests at the 
expense of investors. Boot et al. (2006) provide a model based on an implicit contract between the credit rating 
agency and the firm that should prevent further downgrades. An agency initiates a monitoring regime through the 
credit watch procedure, and an issuer implicitly promises to initiate specific actions to mitigate the possible decline 
of its rating. 4 
In addition to rating changes, the agencies make other rating-related decisions, e.g., 
outlook reports or reviews.
2 According to Steiner and Heinke (2001), Hull et al. (2004), Boot et 
al. (2006) and Altman and Rijken (2007) these announcements may even be more useful to the 
markets than rating changes, having larger effects on bond prices. 
Sometimes, the performance of institutional investors conditions the final effect of rating 
changes. Credit ratings allow for making a distinction between investment and speculative grade 
debt. Some clauses force the investors’ decisions on the observed rating (e.g., pension funds are 
often only allowed to deal with investment grade issues) and influence the effects caused by 
rating changes, even though the changes contain no new information for the market.
3 As well, 
institutional investors usually use a buy-and-hold strategy that can diminish the impact of rating 
changes on trading activity. 
It is important to note that differences in the regulation affecting firms can lead to 
differences in the information content of rating changes (Schweitzer et al., 1992). Thus, for 
highly regulated sectors, such as the financial sector or governmental firms, the market has more 
public information, and the debt of these enterprises is almost guaranteed by the State. Then the 
impact of rating announcements on that type of firm is diminished. This effect may also be 
observed for larger or more profitable firms. For instance, effects of downgrades on larger firms 
may be influenced by the too-big-to-fail paradigm because the market may consider that large 
corporations have systemic importance.
4 
 
3. Trading Measures 
In this study we propose different proxies for corporate bond trading activity to obtain 
measures of abnormal trading activity. Specifically, we analyze the evolution of the trading 
volume and the frequency of trading. To analyze the effect of rating changes, we study these 
                                                 
2 Reviews or watchlist additions occur after special events (e.g., changes in regulation, unexpected changes in 
management, or merger announcements), indicating that the rating is under review for a likely change in a short 
period of time. Outlooks indicate the creditworthiness trend in a medium-term timeframe.  
3 Similarly, specific markets, such as the Eurobond market, may simply require the presence of a particular minimum 
rating before listing the debt issue. 
4 Regulators might intervene to avoid the default of large banks because of serious, adverse effects on the financial 
system. Nevertheless, Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail on September 15, 2008. As a result, this event caused a 
widespread panic in the market. 5 
variables on the day that the rating change is announced in the news (day t = 0) and on days 
surrounding it. Due to infrequent trading, these variables are often unavailable on days t = –1, t = 
0 and t= +1. For this reason, we analyze window-spanning excess of trading activity from t = t1 
to t = t2, where t1 is the last trading day before the announcement and t2 is the first trading day 
after the announcement.  
The trading volume on day t2 is obtained from a measure of the effective trading volume 
for each of the outstanding issues of issuer i. Then we compute the logarithmic rate of change of 
the trading volume between session t2 and the last session prior to t2 during which an asset of the 
issuer was traded, t1,: 
 
21 2 1 ,( ) , , it t i t i t cV v v     (1) 
where vi,t1 and vi,t2 are the logarithms of the trading volume of the outstanding issues of issuer i 
on days t1 and t2, respectively.  
The abnormal trading volume variable,   1 2 , t t i AV  , is obtained by comparing the observed 
rate of change   1 2 , t t i cV  with the expected rate of change in the absence of the event:  
 
21 21 21 ,( ) ,( ) ,( ) () it t it t it t AV cV E cV     (2) 
where 
21 ,( ) () it t Ec V   is the expected or “normal” rate of change of the trading volume on average 
between all of the issues of issuer i, considered as the benchmark.  
The expected trading volumes in t1 and t2 are calculated from three alternative measures 
during the three months prior to t1 and to t2. Two measures are mean daily trading volumes; the 
first one is calculated per traded day (related to the average transaction size) and the second one 
per working day (related to the trading frequency).
5 Thus, they are computed as the average total 
traded volume of the issue in the last three months divided by the number of days on which the 
asset is traded during that period (per traded day) or divided by the number of working days in 
the last three months, regardless of whether the issue has been traded (per working day). The 
third measure is the accumulated trading volume of the asset in the last three months. Finally, we 
obtain the logarithmic rate of change between t2 and t1 of the mean traded volumes per day 
(TVTD), the mean daily trading volume (TVWD), and mean trading volume accumulated in the 
last three months (TVA).  
                                                 
5 Consequently, this latter measure is corrected if the asset is kept outstanding for less than three months. 6 
The second measure is based on comparing the mean trading frequency to the different 
outstanding issues by the issuer on the first day of transactions after the event and the day prior to 
the event. These frequencies are calculated for each issue as the ratio between the number of 
trading days and the number of days on which trading could have taken place, i.e., working days 
in a predefined window. The measure of abnormal frequency is calculated as: 
   1 2 1 2 , , , t i t i t t i f f AF     (3) 
where
2 , it f and
1 , it f are the logarithms of the two relative frequencies mentioned above. We 
consider different sizes of the windows in which
2 , it f and
1 , it f are calculated. For the first windows, 
in which we measure the frequency after the event, we select 1-week and 1-month windows after 
t2. For the second windows, in which we measure the frequency before the event, we consider 1- 
and 3-month windows after t1, and the entire period since issue after t1.
6 In this way, we are able 
to see what happens to abnormal trading activity as the date of the rating change announcement 
approaches and, furthermore, if the impact is only observed in the market immediately after the 
event or it is longer-lasting. 
 
4. Data 
The original data set consists of daily observations derived from actual transactions in all 
commercial paper notes and corporate bonds traded on the secondary market of AIAF (AIAF 
Mercado de Renta Fija - Fixed Income Market).
7 This is by far the leading and almost only 
Spanish corporate fixed income market and is run by the Spanish security dealers association. At 
present, AIAF is one of the leading European corporate fixed income markets. In fact, in 2006, it 
was the second largest European market in mortgage-backed securities
8 and the first largest in 
covered bonds (“Cédulas Hipotecarias”).
9  
We compute the abnormal trading activity measures from daily observations of trading 
volume and transactions carried out on all commercial paper and bonds traded on the secondary 
corporate debt market, AIAF. The database of bonds begins in 1993, whereas the commercial 
                                                 
6 We also consider other windows before and after, but we do not include the results to save space. 
7 Corporate fixed income assets are also listed through the electronic trading system of the Spanish stock exchanges 
and through three of the four Spanish stock exchange markets (Barcelona, Bilbao and Valencia). 
8 ESF Securitisation Data Report, Spring 2007. 
9 Spanish Cédulas Hipotecarias are equivalent to German Pfandbriefe and French Obligations Fonciéres. 7 
paper database begins in 1998, and both end in 2004. For each reference, AIAF provides daily 
information on the number of transactions and the nominal and effective transaction volumes. We 
excluded from the sample issues with special characteristics, such as, for example, floating 
interest rate issues, convertible bonds, issues with tax incentives.  
The sample we analyze in this paper consists of rating announcements of Fitch, Standard 
and Poor’s and Moody’s from June 1993 to December 2004. Part of this information was 
provided by Fitch and Moody’s. We also use the “Hemeroteca de El País” [“El País” newspaper 
library] to obtain information on the announcements of Standard and Poor’s. The original sample 
was composed of 349 rating announcements, including rating changes, outlook reports and 
reviews. 
From the database, we select the issues of re-rated companies, and we exclude the cases 
that lacked the minimum of activity around the announcement date. Likewise, we rule out those 
cases in which the re-rated firm has suffered any other event that might generate abnormal 
behavior in the event window. The final sample consists of 158 rating announcements that affect 
1,058 issues (271 bonds and 787 commercial paper notes).
10 Table 2 presents the 158 events 
divided into six categories: rating upgrades or downgrades, positive or negative outlooks, and 
reviews for downgrades and upgrades. In all, the sample contains 109 rating announcements that 
affect the bond market and 120 that affect the short-term market. Of these, 71 simultaneously 
affect both markets.  
[Insert Table 2] 
Table 2 also presents the number of expected rating announcements. Therefore, similar to 
other authors, we used the reviews to distinguish between expected and unexpected rating 
changes. When a rating change is preceded by a review announcement in the same direction, it 
can be anticipated by the market and will not provide new information. In both market segments 
we find more than 50% of expected rating events. Finally, of the 229 announcements, 143 
involve a decline of creditworthiness and 86 involve improvement. This seems to indicate a 
somewhat increased credit risk in the Spanish corporate debt market during the studied period. 
                                                 
10 In many cases, the rating changes affect companies whose issues are not traded around the event. Other issues are 
not traded in the secondary market because they are fully incorporated into the investors’ portfolios. Moreover, 
some large issuers put their debt into circulation on other international markets.  8 
Table 3 presents the classification of rating announcements according to the number of 
notches the debt shifts after the rating change. Although the three agencies used different symbols 
to designate the different credit risk categories, it is easy to determine the equivalence between 
these symbols. This allows us to transform the ordinal scale applied by the agencies into a 
numeric scale, in which the highest values denote a greater probability of default.
11 Table 3 also 
presents in parentheses those changes that imply an entrance into speculative grade. As we can 
see, only two rating downgrades in the case of bonds caused a drop to the speculative grade.  
[Insert Table 3] 
Focusing on the agency, 49% of rating actions are by Moody’s, 27% by Fitch, and the 
remaining 23% by S&P’s. In addition, we find similar percentages for the two market segments 
individually. Finally, 68% of the announcements correspond to firms in the financial sector 
(savings or commercial bank), and 18% correspond to governmental enterprises. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Estimation of Abnormal Trading Activity 
Almost all issuers affected by rating actions simultaneously maintain various issues on the 
market, especially in the case of commercial paper notes. On most days, several references of 
each issuer are traded on the secondary market. To avoid correlation in the cross section resulting 
from the fact that the trading activity of the references issued by the same company may be 
highly correlated, we construct portfolios with all of the bonds, on the one hand, and all of the 
commercial paper notes, on the other hand, before computing the trading measures. In this way, 
all of the outstanding references of each issuer were aggregated and weighted by the volume of 
issues traded on the corresponding day in a portfolio, which was treated as an individual 
observation. 
In the event analysis, we used two statistics to test the null hypothesis of inexistence of 
abnormal performance due to the rating announcement, i.e., zero mean abnormal trading activity: 
a standard t-ratio and, to avoid the effects of non-normality, the Wilcoxon rank test.  
Results are presented in Table 4. The first panel presents mean abnormal trading activity 
after upgrades and downgrades in the corporate bond portfolios. The results for the commercial 
                                                 
11 Rating Aaa of Moody’s and AAA of Fitch and S&P corresponds to 1 on the numeric scale, rating Aa1 and AA+ to 
2, rating Aa2 and AA to 3, and so on.  9 
paper portfolios are shown in the second panel. The table presents the results for volume-based 
and the frequency-based trading measures.  
[Insert Table 4] 
For bonds, downgrade announcements imply a significantly positive abnormal trading 
frequency, whereas no significant excess trading activity is observed for trading volume. In 
addition, trading activity increases more as the announcement date approaches, i.e., it is more 
clearly observed for the shortest post-event windows. The results are independent of the test we 
use.  
For rating upgrade announcements on bonds, the excess trading activity is also 
significantly positive. This result is robust to proxy of trading activity (volume or frequency) and 
the test used (parametric or non-parametric). For the frequency measures, the effect is greater 
immediately after the announcement, and it diminishes after that date, just as it does for 
downgrades. 
In the case of the short-term corporate debt market (Table 4, right panel), for rating 
upgrades and downgrades, significant effects are detected only with the frequency-based 
measures. The effect is positive in all of the windows, indicating an increase in abnormal 
frequency after the announcement. This increased trading activity diminishes as the post-event 
window is broadened, indicating that its intensity decreases as time passes after the 
announcement. 
In short, for both segments we find a significant positive response of trading activity to 
changes in both directions. An increased, more intense frequency is observed in the periods 
closest to the announcement date. These results are consistent with the predictions of the 
informative content hypothesis and some market microstructure models, but other hypotheses 
postulate on asymmetric performance for credit rating upgrade and downgrade announcements. 
According to Kim and Verrecchia (1994), trading activity will deteriorate around the release of 
an information event. Kandel and Pearson (1995) state that different interpretations of public 
signals resulting in high information asymmetry might be the origin of abnormal increased 
trading volume occurring after the news release.  
 
5.2. Determinants of Abnormal Trading Activity  
The purpose of this section is to analyze the determining factors of trading activity 
movements as a result of rating announcements. To do so, we estimate a multiple regression 10 
model for which the variable to be explained is the measure of abnormal trading activity. The 
model is as follows: 
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78 9 1 0 1 1 1 2
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 (4) 
where 
12 ,( )  it t AT  denotes each of the described abnormal trading activity measures in the event 
window.  
In model (4), the explanatory variables help to verify the different hypotheses presented in 
Section 3. Thus, to test the informative content hypothesis, we include different variables: EXP, 
which equals one if the announcement is preceded by a review in the same direction and zero 
otherwise,
12 and NOTCH, which indicates the number of notches the debt rating changes. We 
also define GRAD; this variable is equal to one when there is a shift from investment grade to 
speculative grade, and zero otherwise. This latter variable also allows us to test the hypothesis of 
pressure on prices associated with rating triggers. This variable is only included in the models for 
downgrades in the case of bonds because only in this case does the sample contain shifts from 
investment to speculative grade. 
   To analyze the effect of agencies’ strategic behavior we include several variables. First, 
the variable AG, which equals one if the announcement is by Moody’s and zero if it is by S&P or 
Fitch, is used to verify the hypothesis of reliability of agencies and competition between them. 
To test the hypothesis of long-term orientation of rating versus other agency actions, we include 
W, which equals 1 if the announcement is a review, and zero otherwise; and O, which equals 1 if 
the event is an outlook report, and zero otherwise. If these rating announcements incorporated 
useful short-term information, then their effect will be positive. 
To consider the effects of the economic cycle, the model included the one-year Euribor 
inter-annual rate of change (IRV).
13 If investors are more concerned with risk in periods of 
economic crisis, we expect a positive effect of this variable.  
We included two variables to analyze the importance of regulation affecting the issuer: 
FIN, which equals one if the announcement refers to a company from the financial sector, and 
                                                 
12 Although this is the habitual definition of expected rating changes, we also construct a variable that is equal to 1 if 
the announcement is preceded by a rating announcement in the same direction in the three preceding months 
(E3M). 
13 In addition, we alternatively consider the growth rate of the economy (GRE). 11 
zero otherwise, and GOV, which equals one in the case of a governmental enterprise, and zero 
otherwise. 
Finally, to analyze the effect of company-specific characteristics, we include three 
variables. One distinguishes between large and small firms. We call it LSIZE, and it equals one if 
the logarithm of the asset is above the mean, and zero otherwise. The other two are performance 
measures: the firm asset growth rate (AGR) and its economic profitability (EP).
14, 15 
To take into account the possibility that some other simultaneous event that affects the 
issuer occurs in the event window, we include two control variables in the model: ISS, which 
indicates the number of issues that constitute the portfolio, and DAY, which measures the number 
of days in the event window, i.e., between t1 and t2.  
Model (4) was estimated separately for the sample of downgrade and upgrade 
announcements, for the sample of bonds and commercial paper, and for the different abnormal 
trading activity measures provided in Section 4.
16 We estimated the models by ordinary least 
squares. To correct for the potential effects of heteroskedasticity in the variance-covariance 
matrix of the OLS estimator, we calculate the White’s estimator of this matrix. Before estimating 
the models, we test the existence of significant correlations between the explanatory variables. 
The presence of multicolinearity in the models is ruled out because the highest correlation we 
find does not exceed 0.45 in any case.  
5.2.1. Results for Downgrades 
  Tables 5 and 6 present the model (4) results in the case of downgrades. The former 
presents the results for trading volume, and the latter presents the results related to trading 
intensity or frequency.  
  The model for the estimation of abnormal trading volume of bonds is presented in the left 
panel of Table 5. As can be observed, no significant effects are found in nearly all of the 
variables, regardless of the trading volume measure used. Therefore, the results do not support 
any of the proposed hypotheses. However, they are not surprising, because we have not found a 
                                                 
14 The economic profitability of the fiscal year has been calculated as the ratio of pre-tax results to total assets. 
15 We obtain the firm balance sheet information from different sources; for financial firms, it was provided by the 
CECA (Spanish Confederation of Savings and Loans) and the AEB (Spanish Commercial Banking Association), 
while for the remaining firms it was obtained from SABI database (Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System). 
16 The segmentation of the sample by announcement type rating event (rating changes, outlook reports or reviews) 
would be interesting, but is not possible due to the small size of the resulting subsamples. 12 
significant response of these abnormal trading volume variables to the rating announcements (see 
Table 4). We only observe that the growth rate of the company has a significant negative effect in 
the case of the mean daily volume of trading (TVWD). This would suggest that the faster the 
asset growth of the issuer, the lower the additional trading volume associated with the rating 
announcement. The effect of this variable on the models for TVWD and TVA is also negative, 
although not significant. The number of issues in the portfolio also indicates a negative 
correlation with the trading volume, as the corresponding parameter is significant in the case of 
TVWD and TVA. 
[Insert Table 5] 
In the case of commercial paper notes (right panel, Table 5) we observe that the abnormal 
volume is lower for financial issuers than for the others, when we use the mean volume per 
trading day. The estimated value for the remaining trading volume measures has a negative sign, 
although the parameter is not significant.  
We also observe that reviews and outlook reports provide different information than the 
rating downgrades themselves, as the impact of variables W and O is negative for the three 
volume measures and significant at 10% for measures TVTD and TVWD, respectively.  
  When we estimate the models for the trading frequency measures (Table 6), the results are 
sharply different. In the case of bonds (left panel), we find some significant factors that seem to 
depend on the size of the window used to calculate the relative frequency before and after the 
announcement.
17 We observe that the explanatory ability of the model is greater for narrower 
post-event windows, and in one of the models the constant is significantly positive, as would be 
expected in light of the results presented in Table 4. 
18  
[Insert Table 6] 
  In general, we find no response of the abnormal frequency to the rating agency in 
question, except in the model for measure 3m-1m, in which variable AG has a significant negative 
effect at 10%. Just as in the case of the volume-based measures, the expected events do not lead 
to a differential effect. The number of notches the rating jumps does not provide any information 
                                                 
17 In computing the frequency measures, the sample sizes change. This is because there is not enough data in some 
cases to calculate the relative frequency in the corresponding pre- or post-event window, especially in the bond 
sample. 
18 The constant term of the model is directly related to the mean of the endogenous variable. It is very probable that 
this parameter will be significant when this mean is different from zero. This is analyzed in the event study. 13 
either. These results are contrary to the informative content hypothesis. The variable GRAD is 
only significant at 10% in the case of measure T-1w. The sign of the effect is negative, contrary 
to what we expect, because the hypothesis of restrictions on institutional investors implies more 
market activity after the shift from investment to speculative grade. Even so, it should be noted 
that in the sample there are only two such grade shifts. 
  As for the variables used to test the regulation hypothesis, the results are ambiguous. In 
the models for the shorter post-event windows, we observe that being in the financial sector has 
significant effects. The effect is positive for T-1m and negative for 3m-1w. In the case of GOV, a 
significant effect is also observed for the wider pre-event windows. This result indicates that the 
trading activity increases after the date of the rating announcement.  
  Regarding the effects of the different rating announcements, we observe that a review 
does not affect abnormal market activity, whereas an outlook report does. In all of the models, 
except for those calculated with the longest pre-event window, we observe that an outlook report 
has significant positive effects. It seems that in the bond segment, the information content of 
these outlook reports is important to investors, and it increases their trading activity. 
  On the other hand, the economic cycle does not provide information to the market. In 
contrast, the inherent characteristics of the issues provide relevant information. In particular, 
economic profitability and the growth rate of the company’s assets have a negative effect on 
trading activity, according to the models for the shorter post-event windows. This result indicates 
that the market reaction to downgrades depends on the information that investors have on the re-
rated companies. The impact of downgrades is weaker on companies with better performance, 
suggesting that investors use other information beside the rating announcements. Finally, no 
effects related to the firm size are observed. This result does not support the too-big-to-fail 
hypothesis.  
The right panel of Table 6 presents the results for rating downgrades in the commercial 
paper segment for the trading frequency measures. Here the explanatory ability of the analyzed 
variables is greater than in the case of bonds. The adjusted R-square of the models range from 
0.412 to 0.233, and the model as a whole is statistically significant in all cases. 
In addition, in this case, the rating agency or the fact that the announcement is expected 
does not provide relevant information in any case. The number of notches that the rating shifts 
after the announcement has a significant positive impact on one of the measures, and the 14 
corresponding estimator is positive for all of them. This result supports the informative content 
theory because the higher the rating jump, the greater the effect on abnormal frequency.  
Variable GOV also has a significant impact on the models corresponding to the 3-month 
pre-event windows. According to the regulation theory, the impact is negative, which indicates 
that the reaction of commercial paper trading activity to a downgrade is weaker for governmental 
firms.  
The type of rating action does not seem to provide relevant information to explain the 
abnormal frequency measures. We observe sharp changes related to the performance of the firms. 
The higher the economic profitability, the lower the abnormal frequency caused by a downgrade 
in commercial paper. This relationship is clearly significant in all of the models. At the same 
time, the asset growth rate has a negative impact, although it is significant only in three models. 
Finally, the company size also has relevant information. For large firms, the abnormal frequency 
after the event has always been lower than for medium-sized companies, which supports the too-
big-to-fail hypothesis. 
5.2.2. Results for Upgrades  
Table 7 presents the estimation of model (4) for trading volume.
19 In the case of bonds 
(left panel), only three variables have significant impacts and, although each one is only 
significant for two trading volume measures, the signs are the same in the one for which the 
variable was not significant. Specifically, we observe that the parameter associated with FIN is 
significant and negative, indicating a lower increase in abnormal bond market activity for 
financial issuers. Just as for downgrades, this result supports regulation hypothesis. The 
parameter associated with economic profitability (EP) is also significant and negative, indicating 
a lower impact for the more profitable companies. On the contrary, the parameter associated with 
EXP is positive, which indicates that the excess volume in bonds after upgrades is greater for 
expected events. This result disagrees with the informative content hypothesis, although it may 
be related to the reputation hypothesis. According to that hypothesis, agencies allocate more 
resources to revealing negative information than positive. As a result, after upgrades, investors do 
                                                 
19 In this case, the sample for some trading frequency measures is very small, especially in the case of bonds. 
Therefore, it is not possible to simultaneously estimate the effect of all of the variables under consideration. Thus, 
we made an initial estimation by individually including the variables, and we selected those that presented a 
greater correlation with the endogenous variable. This criterion was used in all of the models for upgrades.  15 
not pay attention to the reviews, but rather seem to wait for confirmation of the change to make 
their decisions. 
[Insert Table 7] 
Regarding the commercial paper notes (right panel, Table 7), no significant effects are 
found except for AG in the case of TVTD. This suggests that, just as in the bond segment, when 
the announcement is made by Moody’s, the impact on abnormal volume is different than when 
the announcement is made by the other agencies.  
Table 8 presents the results of the estimation of model (4) using trading frequency 
measures. In one of the models, the constant is significantly positive, as is expected in light of the 
results presented in Table 4. As can be observed, for bonds, two variables that characterize the 
announcements have significant parameters: AG and NOTCH. Variable AG has a significant and 
positive parameter in two models. In this case, the rating upgrades made by Moody’s increase the 
frequency of abnormal bond trading to a higher extent than the other two agencies. The parameter 
of NOTCH is also significant and positive only in one of the models, indicating that the higher 
the number of notches the rating shifts upward, the greater the increase of abnormal frequency. 
On the other hand, the economy’s growth rate has a negative impact on one model. As 
postulated by the economic environment hypothesis, investors attach more value to upgrades 
when the general economic situation is worse.  
When we analyze the results for trading frequency measures in the short-term market (see 
right panel, Table 8), we find a good number of variables that significantly affect trading 
intensity. Moreover, the variables and the signs of the effects reflect the situation in the bond 
market. In accordance with the regulation hypothesis, the impact on abnormal frequency is 
weaker when the announcement refers to financial firms subject to more regulations. Upgrades 
related to the most profitable issuing companies result in a lower trading activity increase in the 
market, in accordance with the baseline hypothesis.  
Finally, the effects of upgrade announcements differ in the commercial paper notes 
segment according to the cycle phase. Just as with the volume-based measures, worsening 
economic conditions cause less impact of upgrades on abnormal frequency. This may also be 
related to the agency loss of reputation hypothesis. 
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6. Conclusions 
We analyze the impact of credit rating agencies’  announcements of rating changes, 
outlook reports and reviews on the trading volume and trading frequency of the Spanish 
corporate debt market, and, in particular, on the trading activity of bonds and commercial paper 
notes. Data from the Spanish corporate fixed income market allows us to perform this kind of 
analysis. Specifically, our objective was to answer several questions: Do rating announcements 
have any impact on the trading activity of the Spanish corporate debt market? If so, what are the 
determinants of that effect? Are they the ones that would be expected in light of the reinterpreted 
hypotheses formulated in the literature to explain the impact on prices? Two methodologies are 
used to answer these questions: event analysis and cross-section regressions. Additionally, a set 
of eight trading variables are used: three that are volume-based and five that are frequency-based.  
With respect to the first question, our findings indicate that both rating upgrade and 
downgrade announcements cause a significant increase in abnormal trading activity, which is 
clearly evident when trading frequency is analyzed. In accordance with the informative content 
hypothesis, that evidence reveals that both types of announcements contain relevant information 
for Spanish corporate debt market investors and cause the same kind of reaction: increases in 
trading activity of the securities by the firms targeted by the announcement. 
Regarding the study of the determinants of abnormal market activity, the results were 
consistent with the literature in several ways. First of all, as some authors argue, the stability of 
ratings forces investors to seek additional information from other sources. For instance, Spanish 
market investors combine the information contained in the announcements with the 
characteristics of the issuer, its profitability, the growth it has experienced, and its size. Second, 
we find clear evidence in favor of the regulation hypothesis. In general, when announcements 
refer to financial firms, subject to greater regulation, there is a weaker impact on trading 
frequency. The same is true for governmental firms, though in a less explicit way. Third, the 
impact of the announcements is not independent from the economic cycle, and the results support 
the proposed hypothesis, i.e., they are counter-cyclical in the case of downgrades and cyclical in 
the case of upgrades. Fourth, as it is postulated in the informative content hypothesis, the higher 
the number of notches the rating shifts, the greater the impact on trading frequency.  
On the other hand, we find evidence that disagrees with the most frequent position in the 
literature regarding the credibility of the rating agencies. In contrast to other markets, the Spanish 
market grants greater credibility to the rating upgrades made by Moody’s, which may be related 17 
to its higher relative weight, illustrated by almost 50% of the rating actions analyzed in our 
sample, and to the fact that it has been operating for a longer time on the Spanish market. 
In a final conclusion, these results provide new evidence that makes it possible to assess 
the role of the rating agencies in the financial market. They help to understand the determinants 
of trading activity in the corporate bond market following a rating announcement. The results 
suggest that the information these announcements contain is incomplete, in the sense that 
investors also base their decisions on other factors. This may be a general pattern in all 
international markets or may indicate a specific Spanish situation. However, to answer this 
question, evidence from other countries needs to be generated.   
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Table 1. Summary of hypothesis about the effect on trading activity to rating announcements 
Hypothesis  Effects on trading activity  
Information content hypothesis    Rating announcement cause an increase in market activity  
  The greater the jump in notches, the greater the expected trading reaction  
  Expected changes cause no effects on market activity 
Market microstructure    Balduzzi  et al. (2001): After rating announcements a lower level of market 
activity is expected 
  Kim and Verrecchia (1994): higher trading activity after the rating announcement 
will be expected. 
Agencies behaviour    Stability of ratings: Rating changes do not affect activity 
  Refinement of ratings: Other rating announcement increase market activity more 
than rating changes does 
  Moral hazard risk problem:  Rating changes have no effect on trading activity 
  Competition between agencies: Different effect related with different agency 
  Reputation of the agencies: The rise on market activity is greater for downgrades 
than for upgrades 
Economic environment    the effects of rating announcements differ according to the current phase of the 
economic cycle 
Investment restrictions    Downgrades from investment to speculative grade increase trading activity more 
  Upgrades from speculative to investment grade do not affect activity  
  Buy-and-hold strategies diminish the impact of rating changes on trading activity 
Differences in regulation    The effect of rating announcement of financial and governmental firms is 
weaker. 
Characteristics of the firm    too-big-to-fail: Effects for banks and large corporations is weaker than for 
smaller companies 
  Differences on market activity related with company’s profitability or growth 
rate 
Asymmetries    The impact on activity is higher for downgrades than for upgrades 




Table 2. Distribution of Rating Announcements Analyzed 
  Bonds 
Commercial Paper 
Notes  Total 
Downgrades  73 70  143 
        Rating  38 (25) [24] 36  (25) [24]  74 
        Outlook  12 [8]  9 [8]  21 
        Review  23 [15]  25 [15]  48 
Upgrades  36 50  86 
        Rating  17 (9) [12]  23 (12) [12]  40 
        Outlook  11 [8]  20 [8]  31 
        Review  8 [4]  7 [4]  15 
Total  109 (34) [71]  120 (37) [71]  229 
Note: Expected announcements are in parentheses. Coincidences between segments are in brackets  
 
Table 3. Distribution of Rating Grade Changes 
  Bonds    Commercial Paper Notes   
Notches Downgrades  Upgrades  Downgrades  Upgrades  Total 
1  29 12    30 13  84 
2  38 19    34 32  123 
3  2 2    4 1  9 
4  1 3    2 3  9 
5        1  1 
6  2 (1)         2 
10  1 (1)         1 
Total  73 36    70 50  229 
Note: Notches is the number of categories that the debt rating changes. In the case of outlook reports and 
reviews, it is considered that a shift of one grade has occurred. The changes that imply entering or 
leaving the speculative grade are in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Abnormal Trading Activity 
 Bonds  Commercial paper notes 
  Downgrades   Upgrades  Downgrades   Upgrades 
   AT % T-ratio  WRT    AT % T-ratio WRT AT % T-ratio WRT    AT % T-ratio  WRT 
Volume Measures 
TVTD  -0.087 -0.450  0.096   0.834 2.523** 2.001* -0.177 -0.623 0.175    0.025  0.105 0.193 
   (0.653)  (0.924)      (0.012) (0.045)  (0.533)  (0.861)      (0.916)  (0.847)
TVWD  0.063 0.712 1.644    0.628 2.129**2.332** -0.455 -1.396 0.921    -0.039  -0.116  0.303 
   (0.476)  (0.100)      (0.033) (0.020)  (0.163)  (0.357)      (0.908)  (0.762)
TVA  -0.148 -0.630  0.431   1.355 3.234**2.843** -0.706 -1.561 1.551    -0.402  -0.787  0.666 
   (0.529)  (0.667)      (0.001) (0.005)  (0.119)  (0.121)      (0.431)  (0.505)
Frequency Measures 
T-1w  0.354 8.815**  5.626**   0.371 3.923**2.951** 0.692 21.367** 6.843*  0.701 14.42** 5.639**
   (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000) (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)
T-1m  0.089 2.258** 1.860*  0.217 2.575**2.613** 0.284 7.890** 6.101**  0.349 6.861** 5.254**
   (0.024)  (0.063)      (0.010) (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)
3m-1w  0.408 9.232**  5.752**   0.511 5.035**3.551**  0.509  15.243** 6.539**   0.556  14.15**  5.295**
   (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)      (0.000) (0.000)
3m-1m  0.197 4.768*  3.891**    0.311 4.092**3.077** 0.118 3.242** 2.808**  0.139 3.424** 3.148**
   (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000) (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.005)      (0.001)  (0.002)
1m-1w  0.276 5.848**  4.391**   0.334 3.122**2.485** 0.270 7.770** 5.686**  0.292 7.674** 5.252**
   (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.002) (0.013)  (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)
1m-1m  0.060 1.493 1.423    0.088 1.183 1.216 0.053 1.550 1.806    -0.062  -1.393  2.218 
   (0.135)  (0.155)      (0.237) (0.224)  (0.121)  (0.071)      (0.164)  (0.027)
 
Note: AT%: Mean abnormal trading activity in percentage. WRT: Wilcoxon rank test. TVTD: total volume traded in the last three 
months divided by the number of days on which each asset is traded during that period. TVWD: mean daily trading volume in the
last three months. TVA: mean daily trading volume accumulated in the last three months. Abnormal frequencies calculated as the 
difference of the logarithm of the mean trading frequency of a pre-event window (PREW) with respect to a post-event window 
(POSTW): PREW-POSTW., where PREW= 1, 3 months and the entire period since the issue (1M, 3M, T) and POSTW= 1 week 




Table 5. Determinants of abnormal trading activity after rating downgrades: Volume 
measures  
 Bonds  Commercial paper notes
   TVTD TVWD  TVA   TVTD TVWD  TVA   
Constant  -0.666 1431  1.504  3.238 1.310 1.893   
  ( 0.656) ( 0.475)  ( 0.458)  ( 0.255) ( 0.413)  ( 0.287)  
Expected (EXP)  -0.035 -0.281  -0.311  -1.413 -0.805 -0.582  
  ( 0.960) ( 0.754)  ( 0.735)  ( 0.312) ( 0.367)  ( 0.558)  
No. of Notches Shifts (NOTCH)   0.234   0.177   0.207   0.273   0.255  -0.314   
  ( 0.472) ( 0.621)  ( 0.561)  ( 0.896) ( 0.817)  ( 0.812)  
Shift from invest. to spec. (GRAD)   0.061   0.258   0.026  -- -- --   
  ( 0.953) ( 0.849)  ( 0.984)    
Moody’s (AG)   0.394   0.324   0.160  -0.372 -0.658 -0.987  
  ( 0.402) ( 0.534)  ( 0.769)  ( 0.735) ( 0.366)  ( 0.254)  
Review (W)   0.427   0.661   0.879  -4.468* -2.025 -2.651  
  ( 0.610) ( 0.530)  ( 0.431)  ( 0.094) ( 0.173)  ( 0.120)  
Outlook (O)   0.764   0.611   0.679  -1.682 -1.392* -0.114  
  ( 0.376) ( 0.553)  ( 0.518)  ( 0.284) ( 0.064)  ( 0.910)  
Interest rate variation (IRV)  -0.692 -1.687  -2.020  2.704 1.818   0.901   
  ( 0.389) ( 0.132)  ( 0.111)  ( 0.180) ( 0.336)  ( 0.580)  
Financial Sector (FIN)  0.438  -0.241  -0.153  -4.150* -0.369 -1.818  
  ( 0.554) ( 0.813)  ( 0.883)  ( 0.053) ( 0.730)  ( 0.211)  
Governmental Enterprise (GOV)  -0.148 -1.662  -1.619  -1.393   0.346 1.703  
  ( 0.939) ( 0.459)  ( 0.474)  ( 0.508) ( 0.812)  ( 0.270)  
Large Size (LSIZE)   0.141  -0.678  -0.619  -0.794 -0.615 -0.328  
  ( 0.876) ( 0.581)  ( 0.623)  ( 0.574) ( 0.499)  ( 0.739)  
Asset growth rate (AGR)  -1.258* -0.782 -0.989   0.474  1.102  -0.203   
  ( 0.088) ( 0.450)  ( 0.342)  ( 0.774) ( 0.290)  ( 0.857)  
Economic Profitability (EP)  5.528 -5.292 -7.654  -15.350 12.572 -9.084  
  ( 0.683) ( 0.728)  ( 0.633)  ( 0.564) ( 0.512)  ( 0.700)  
No. of issues (ISS)  -0.215 -0.565** -0.621**  0.115   0.034   0.083   
  ( 0.308) ( 0.047)  ( 0.032)  ( 0.172) ( 0.498)  ( 0.108)  
Window size (DAY)  -0.002 -0.003  -0.003   0.002   0.063  -0.016   
  ( 0.662) ( 0.512)  ( 0.570)  ( 0.987) ( 0.271)  ( 0.827)  
Adjusted R-squared  -0.038 -0.005    0.022   0.039  -0.029  -0.043   
F   0.824   0.979  1.107  1.193   0.864   0.805   
F p-val ( 0.641) ( 0.487)  ( 0.373)  ( 0.312) ( 0.594)  ( 0.652)  
Obs  68 68  68  63 63 63   
Note: See Table 4 note. EXP: dummy equal to one if the announcement is preceded by a CreditWatch list input/output in 
the same direction, NOTCH: number of notches that the debt rating changes, GRAD: dummy equal to one when the 
announcement implies a shift from investment grade to speculative grade, AG: dummy worth 1 if the announcement is 
from Moody’s, W: dummy equal to one if the announcement is a review, O: dummy equal to one if the announcement is a 
outlook report, IRV: is the rate of inter-annual variation of the Euribor at one year, FIN: dummy equal to one when the 
announcement refers to a financial sector company, GOV: dummy equal to one when a governmental enterprise is 
involved, LSIZE: dummy equal to if the logarithm of the company asset is above the mean, AGR: is the growth rate of the 
company asset, EP: is the economic profitability of the company, ISS: is the no. of issues that form the portfolio, DAY: is 
the number of days in the window (t1, t2). TVTD: total volume traded in the last three months divided by the number of 
days on which each asset is traded during that period. TVWD: mean daily trading volume in the last three months. TVA: 
mean daily trading volume accumulated in the last three months. Estimation by OLS with the White’s estimator of the 
variance-covariance matrix robust for heteroskedasticity. * and ** indicate significance at least at 10% or at 5%, 
respectively. p-value is in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Determinants of abnormal trading activity after rating downgrades: Frequency 
measures 
 Bonds  Commercial  paper notes 
   T-1w T-1m 3m-1w  3m-1m 1m-1w    T-1w T-1m  3m-1w  3m-1m  1m-1w 
Const.   0.185  -0.029  0.907**   0.275  0.523   0.858**  0.502**  0.732**   0.326   0.503**
  ( 0.428)  ( 0.913) ( 0.001)  ( 0.284) ( 0.238)  ( 0.000)  ( 0.027)  ( 0.000)  ( 0.117)  ( 0.006) 
EXP   0.038  -0.146  0.115   0.018  0.032   0.009  -0.170  -0.068  -0.140   0.044 
  ( 0.765)  ( 0.244) ( 0.347)  ( 0.872) ( 0.788)  ( 0.914)  ( 0.231)  ( 0.520)  ( 0.274)  ( 0.707) 
NOTCH   0.068  -0.027  0.043  -0.017  0.063   0.068   0.120   0.138   0.212**   0.132* 
  ( 0.153)  ( 0.643) ( 0.385)  ( 0.743) ( 0.315)  ( 0.526)  ( 0.250)  ( 0.213)  ( 0.004)  ( 0.100) 
GRAD  -0.518*    0.039 -0.198  -0.100 -0.449  -0.098  -0.056 -0.262* -0.035  -0.030 
  ( 0.095)  ( 0.933) ( 0.546)  ( 0.802) ( 0.282)  ( 0.379)  ( 0.732)  ( 0.051)  ( 0.825)  ( 0.825) 
AG -0.089    0.015 -0.164*  -0.029 -0.106 -0.024 -0.013 -0.078 -0.009 -0.028 
  ( 0.369)  ( 0.860) ( 0.089)  ( 0.756) ( 0.460)  ( 0.709)  ( 0.855)  ( 0.274)  ( 0.911)  ( 0.725) 
W   0.014  -0.165  0.099   0.101  0.124   0.028  -0.124   0.077  -0.011   0.092 
  ( 0.941)  ( 0.324) ( 0.542)  ( 0.515) ( 0.557)  ( 0.845)  ( 0.491)  ( 0.612)  ( 0.948)  ( 0.601) 
O   0.088  -0.055  0.351**   0.264*  0.268**  0.000  -0.179   0.030  -0.242  -0.093 
  ( 0.484)  ( 0.702) ( 0.009)  ( 0.062) ( 0.029)  ( 0.998)  ( 0.300)  ( 0.780)  ( 0.139)  ( 0.455) 
IRV  -0.115   0.018  0.198   0.148  0.029   0.149   0.268   0.057   0.225   0.006 
  ( 0.643)  ( 0.925) ( 0.244)  ( 0.332) ( 0.900)  ( 0.105)  ( 0.102)  ( 0.560)  ( 0.162)  ( 0.963) 
FIN   0.032   0.238* -0.399**   0.109 -0.232  -- -- -- -- -- 
  ( 0.828)  ( 0.063) ( 0.044)  ( 0.535) ( 0.399)       
GOV   0.491**   0.366* -0.208   0.181 -0.270   0.114  -0.155  -0.475**  -0.333**   0.200 
  ( 0.027)  ( 0.050) ( 0.365)  ( 0.399) ( 0.360)  ( 0.485)  ( 0.542)  ( 0.005)  ( 0.012)  ( 0.268) 
LSIZE    0.175 -0.069 -0.005 -0.056   0.000  -0.019  -0.057 -0.187** -0.118  -0.116 
  ( 0.218)  ( 0.575) ( 0.974)  ( 0.767) ( 0.998)  ( 0.781)  ( 0.570)  ( 0.033)  ( 0.205)  ( 0.166) 
AGR -0.468**  -0.196* -0.786**  -0.218 -0.251  -0.337** -0.364**   0.055 -0.240* -0.084 
  ( 0.001)  ( 0.096) ( 0.000)  ( 0.227) ( 0.353)  ( 0.010)  ( 0.011)  ( 0.670)  ( 0.061)  ( 0.529) 
EP  -3.298  3.474 -10.78** -2.182 -6.332  -5.678** -4.649** -5.101** -5.106** -5.516**
  ( 0.160)  ( 0.151) ( 0.000)  ( 0.407) ( 0.170)  ( 0.000)  ( 0.019)  ( 0.004)  ( 0.021)  ( 0.011) 
ISS   0.033   0.040 -0.007  -0.010 -0.007  -0.007   0.008  -0.001   0.008  -0.005 
  ( 0.311)  ( 0.220) ( 0.835)  ( 0.756) ( 0.898)  ( 0.233)  ( 0.198)  ( 0.847)  ( 0.150)  ( 0.455) 
DAY  -0.001   0.000  0.000   0.003 -0.004  -0.041** -0.021  -0.027*   0.003   0.016 
  ( 0.205)  ( 0.857) ( 0.685)  ( 0.404) ( 0.754)  ( 0.035)  ( 0.357)  ( 0.075)  ( 0.879)  ( 0.488) 
Adj. R
2   0.120   0.158  0.282   0.114 -0.078   0.412   0.233   0.258   0.306   0.207 
F  1.420   1.748*  2.373**  1.504   0.798   3.959**  2.400**  2.338**   3.032**   2.107**
F p-val  ( 0.206)  ( 0.082) ( 0.019)  ( 0.153) ( 0.663)  ( 0.000)  ( 0.014)  ( 0.022)  ( 0.003)  ( 0.034) 
Obs  44  57  50  56  40    56 61 51 61 56 
Note: See note in Table 5. Abnormal frequencies calculated as the difference of the logarithm of the mean trading frequency of a 
pre-event window (PREW) with respect to a post-event window (POSTW): PREW-POSTW., where PREW= 1, 3 months and the 
entire period since the issue (1m, 3m, T) and POSTW= 1 week and 1 month (1w, 1m). 
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Table 7. Determinants of abnormal trading activity after rating upgrades: Volume 
measures 
 Bonds  Commercial paper notes
   TVTD TVWD  TVA    TVTD TVWD  TVA 
Constant  4.060 6.002   6.415* 2.346  2.631    0.711 
  ( 0.170)  ( 0.115)  ( 0.081)  ( 0.444)  ( 0.366)  ( 0.705) 
Expected (EXP)   2.212**   2.953*  2.215  -- -- -- 
  ( 0.041)  ( 0.052)  ( 0.114)     
Expected (E3M)  -- --  --   0.488  1.508   0.173 
       ( 0.735)  ( 0.312)  ( 0.832) 
No. of grade shifts (GRAD)   0.117   0.545   0.258   0.277  -0.033  -0.573 
  ( 0.767)  ( 0.290)  ( 0.573)  ( 0.710)  ( 0.967)  ( 0.280) 
Moody’s (AG)   0.047  -0.098   0.067   1.710*  1.221   0.543 
  ( 0.964)  ( 0.934)  ( 0.956)  ( 0.100)  ( 0.275)  ( 0.297) 
Review (W)  1.404 2.803  1.856 -0.759 -1.795 -0.902 
  ( 0.368)  ( 0.143)  ( 0.302)  ( 0.660)  ( 0.328)  ( 0.235) 
Outlook (O)   0.535  1.157   0.367  -0.120   0.307   0.478 
  ( 0.584)  ( 0.369)  ( 0.754)  ( 0.917)  ( 0.801)  ( 0.459) 
Economy Growth Rate (GRE)   0.027   0.217   0.120  -- -- -- 
  ( 0.921)  ( 0.487)  ( 0.695)     
Interest rate variation (IRV)  -- --  --  -1.329 -0.080   0.835 
       ( 0.451)  ( 0.970)  ( 0.388) 
Financial Sector (FIN)  -3.524 -5.591* -5.074*  -3.218 -3.166 -0.322 
  ( 0.164)  ( 0.082)  ( 0.100)  ( 0.212)  ( 0.212)  ( 0.844) 
Large Size (LSIZE)  -0.856 -1.179  -1.242  -0.605 -0.354   0.517 
  ( 0.450)  ( 0.367)  ( 0.332)  ( 0.517)  ( 0.727)  ( 0.406) 
Economic Profitability (EP)  -69.313 -118.677* -108.041*  -72.529 -68.887 -22.661 
  ( 0.195)  ( 0.075)  ( 0.086)  ( 0.202)  ( 0.216)  ( 0.489) 
Adjusted R-squared  -0.029   0.075    0.020  -0.069 -0.051   0.034 
F   0.904  1.278  1.070   0.664   0.746  1.185 
F p-val  ( 0.539)  ( 0.303)  ( 0.421)  ( 0.736)  ( 0.665)  ( 0.332) 
Obs  32 32  32  48 48 48 
Note: See note in Tables 4 and 5.  E3M: dummy worth 1 if the announcement has been preceded by an announcement in the same 
direction in the three previous months, GRE: is the growth rate of the economy (GDP).  
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Table 8. Determinants of abnormal trading activity after rating upgrades: Frequency 
measures 
  Bonds  Commercial paper notes 
   T-1w T-1m  3m-1w  3m-1m 1m-1w   T-1w T-1m  3m-1w  3m-1m  1m-1w 
Const  -0.175  -0.350   0.924   0.557   0.733   0.484   0.193   0.353   0.042   0.799** 
  ( 0.864)  ( 0.660)  ( 0.193)  ( 0.311) ( 0.225) ( 0.163) ( 0.607)  ( 0.209)  ( 0.880)  ( 0.004) 
EXP   0.068   0.300   0.003   0.390  -0.386  -- -- --  -- -- 
  ( 0.924)  ( 0.429)  ( 0.992)  ( 0.273) ( 0.305)       
E3M --  --  --  --  --  -0.082 -0.110   0.082  -0.056 -0.043 
         ( 0.572) ( 0.455)  ( 0.376)  ( 0.613)  ( 0.683) 
NOTCH   0.163   0.212*  -0.028  -0.018  -0.057  -0.035 -0.007 -0.007    0.037 -0.011 
  ( 0.500)  ( 0.085)  ( 0.748)  ( 0.878) ( 0.567) ( 0.510) ( 0.925)  ( 0.860)  ( 0.524)  ( 0.796) 
AG   0.539   0.439*   0.335   0.205   0.741*   0.107   0.176   0.041   0.158   0.103 
  ( 0.199)  ( 0.093)  ( 0.260)  ( 0.415) ( 0.068) ( 0.396) ( 0.159)  ( 0.665)  ( 0.119)  ( 0.250) 
W   0.207    0.468  -0.167  -0.106  -0.386  -0.104 -0.163   0.055  -0.077 -0.185 
  ( 0.773)  ( 0.308)  ( 0.612)  ( 0.766) ( 0.270) ( 0.560) ( 0.429)  ( 0.726)  ( 0.625)  ( 0.230) 
O -0.285    0.000  -0.258    0.130  -0.565  -0.111 -0.213   0.102  -0.203 -0.185 
  ( 0.674)  -1,000  ( 0.272)  ( 0.644) ( 0.114) ( 0.481) ( 0.192)  ( 0.356)  ( 0.118)  ( 0.124) 
GRE -0.121  -0.121**  -0.065  -0.077  -0.008  -- -- --  -- -- 
  ( 0.160)  ( 0.008)  ( 0.367)  ( 0.116) ( 0.877)       
IRV --  --  --  --  -- -0.197 -0.392** -0.069  -0.297  -0.242 
         ( 0.268) ( 0.023)  ( 0.695)  ( 0.107)  ( 0.134) 
FIN   0.373  -0.021  -0.026  -0.408  -0.144  0.237   0.167   0.172   0.041  -0.402**
  ( 0.503)  ( 0.961)  ( 0.961)  ( 0.323) ( 0.700) ( 0.329) ( 0.495)  ( 0.397)  ( 0.831)  ( 0.031) 
LSIZE   0.383   0.056  -0.356  -0.010   0.042   0.045   0.022   0.050   0.023  -0.046 
  ( 0.246)  ( 0.711)  ( 0.379)  ( 0.969) ( 0.854) ( 0.713) ( 0.866)  ( 0.634)  ( 0.818)  ( 0.613) 
EP  -6.100 -2.993 -6.625  -9.053  -14.451 4.660 2.319   0.169  1.218  -9.412**
  ( 0.571)  ( 0.726)  ( 0.363)  ( 0.109) ( 0.177) ( 0.484) ( 0.717)  ( 0.970)  ( 0.737)  ( 0.025) 
Adj. R
2  -0.565   0.250   0.380   0.357   0.629  -0.126   0.007 -0.175  -0.008 -0.052 
F   0.519  1,593  2.020  1.924  3.265   0.513  1.032   0.437   0.963   0.786 
F p-val  ( 0.804)  ( 0.276)  ( 0.202)  ( 0.219) ( 0.180) ( 0.853) ( 0.435)  ( 0.902)  ( 0.486)  ( 0.631) 
Obs  13 17 16  16  13    40 45 35  45 40 
Note: See note in Table 5. E3M: dummy worth 1 if the announcement has been preceded by an announcement in the same 
direction in the three previous months, GRE: is the growth rate of the economy (GDP). Abnormal frequencies calculated as the 
difference of the logarithm of the mean trading frequency of a pre-event window (PREW) with respect to a post-event window 
(POSTW): PREW-POSTW., where PREW= 1, 3 months and the entire period since the issue (1m, 3m, T) and POSTW= 1 week 
and 1 month (1w, 1m). 
 
 
 